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Abstract. The optimism bias is a well-established
psychological phenomenon. Its study has implications
that are far reaching in fields as diverse as mental
health and economic theory. With the emerging field of
cognitive neuroscience and the advent of advanced neu-
roimaging techniques, it has been possible to investigate
the neural basis of the optimism bias and to understand
in which neurological conditions this natural bias fails.
This review first defines the optimism bias, discusses its
implications and reviews the literature that investigates
its neural basis. Finally some potential pitfalls in
experimental design are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Let us assume that John is a very poor student. He has
not studied at all for his upcoming exam and has even
sat a practice test which he failed. Despite all of this
evidence, John believes that his chances of passing the
upcoming exam are very high. Since his expectation is
better than reality he is being unrealistically optimistic.
John exhibits the optimism bias. This definition causes
a problem for researchers who want to study the opti-
mism bias. The experimenter cannot possibly have ac-
cess to all of the variables that will affect John’s exam
result. Hence, it is virtually impossible for an experi-
menter to accurately quantify an individual’s probabil-
ity of experiencing a particular event (Weinstein, 1980).
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2 The Study of the Optimism
Bias
One way for scientists to test the optimism bias in the
laboratory is to ask an individual to predict his chances
of experiencing an event and then following up to see
whether the event transpired. The problem with this
approach is that the outcome of an event does not al-
ways accurately represent the person’s prior chances to
attain that outcome; this is especially true when the
outcome is a binary one. For example, we know that an
individual has an infinitesimally small chance at winning
the national lottery. If Peter predicts that he has a 75%
chance of winning next week’s lottery and then happens
to win the lottery, this does not mean that Peter was
actually pessimistic in his prediction. It simply means
that he was very lucky, over and above being very opti-
mistic.
While it is extremely difficult to tell whether an indi-
vidual is being unrealistically optimistic, it is relatively
easy to show that, as a group, people are unrealistically
optimistic (Weinstein, 1980). If it can be shown that
the majority of people in a group believe that they are
superior to the majority of other people in that group,
then it can be inferred that some of these people are un-
realistically optimistic (Sharot et al., 2012; Weinstein,
1980). For example, (Svenson, 1981) showed that 88
percent of US drivers believe that they are safer drivers
than the median driver. People were also shown to think
that they were more likely than their colleagues to like
their post-graduate job or to own their own home. At
the same time participants thought that they were less
likely than their colleagues to have a drinking problem
or to attempt suicide (Weinstein, 1980). People also re-
main unrealistically optimistic about their own futures
despite clear evidence that they should not be.
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3 Psychological Mechanisms Un-
derlying the Optimism Bias
Classical theories of learning suggest that if a person is
given accurate information that contradicts their belief,
then that person should subsequently update their ex-
pectations in a Bayesian manner (Pearce and Hall, 1980;
Sharot, 2011). In a study set up by (Sharot, 2011), it
was found that healthy individuals update their expec-
tations in an asymmetrical way. If participants were
given news that exceeded their expectations, they up-
dated their future expectations according to the classical
learning theory. However, if the news was worse than
they expected they updated their future expectations
slightly, but this did not reflect the extent of the news
(cf. Eli and Rao 2011). An illustrative example given
in the paper was that if a participant expected that his
chances of getting cancer was 40% and was told that his
actual likelihood was 30% then subsequently, the partic-
ipant would probably decrease his expectations of cancer
to about 31%. If, on the other hand he estimated his
likelihood of getting cancer at 10% but was told that
the true likelihood was 30%, he would subsequently not
update his expectation to 30% but perhaps update it to
about 14%. Evidence also shows that both younger and
older individuals exhibit a greater asymmetry in belief
updating. Hence, children and elderly individuals tend
to have problems learning from bad news (Chowdhury
et al., 2013; Moutsiana et al., 2013).
There is a group of individuals that do not show this
bias. (Strunk et al., 2006) showed that dysphoric, or
mildly depressed, individuals do not show any bias (op-
timistic or pessimistic). It is important to note that
this does not necessarily mean that a dysphoric indi-
vidual is always realistic, but that on average any biases
they have cancel each other out. The authors also found
that as a person becomes more depressed they are more
likely to show a pessimistic bias.
As a result, experimenters have argued that healthy
individuals have a tendency to be optimistically biased.
This is in line with animal experiments that showed
healthy, well treated animals to be optimistically biased
whereas animals in poor environmental condition did
not show the bias (Matheson et al., 2008). Traditionally,
psychologists have maintained that a realistic outlook on
life is the hallmark of mental health and wellbeing (Tay-
lor and Brown, 1988). (Lazarus, 1983) started question-
ing this fundamental tenant of mental health. One could
imagine a scenario were two cavemen, Peter and Max,
are sitting in their cave and hear a rustle outside. This
same sound could represent food, a little edible squirrel,
or alternatively it could be a predator, the soft rustle
of a lion’s paws over leaves. In most situations it is a
squirrel but occasionally it is a lion. Peter is optimistic
and goes out; Max is pessimistic and stays in. Which
one is better off? In this case Peter got eaten by the
Lion, but if Max never leaves the cave he will starve to
death. (McKay and Dennett, 2009) argue that although
misbeliefs in general are maladaptive for an organism,
positive false beliefs, such as the optimism bias, are gen-
erally adaptive. In fact, there is an increasing amount
of studies showing that people who exhibit moderate
levels of unrealistic optimism are better off than coun-
terparts who have no bias, a pessimistic bias or an exces-
sively optimistic bias (Friedman et al., 1995; Puri and
Robinson, 2007). For example, optimistic individuals
are more likely to comply with medical treatment and
attend follow-up appointments (Friedman et al., 1995;
Scheier et al., 1989). (Varki, 2009) takes an extreme
point of view and proposed that optimism is not only
useful but is indeed essential for human beings to func-
tion properly and survive. He states that with the abil-
ity to prospect comes the knowledge that death awaits
each and every one of us. He proposes that without an
unrealistically optimistic outlook on life humans would
be overcome by great fear that would essentially ren-
der us extinct. Hence, the optimism bias is adaptive
and likely to have been evolutionarily preserved for two
crucial reasons. First, despite being inaccurate in their
predictions of future events, optimistic individuals are
more likely to be motivated to improve their wellbeing.
For example, if an individual thinks they are less likely
than the average person to contract disease X they may
actively find ways to ensure that they do not, thus the
prediction becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Second,
they are less likely to be overwhelmed by an existential-
ist crisis that could lead to suicide. The increase in the
optimism bias in elderly individuals may be a mecha-
nism for elderly individuals to cope with the increasing
health problems that arise in old age (Chowdhury et al.,
2013).
Although moderate unrealistic optimism can indeed
be adaptive, excessive optimism has, on the other hand,
been shown to be maladaptive. Collective unrealistic op-
timism has been, in part, blamed for some of the greatest
economic follies of our time such as the economic bub-
bles (and their inevitable crash) (Johnson and Fowler,
2011). While moderate optimists are generally selective
risk takers and make relatively good economic decisions,
extreme optimists tend to make decisions that are gen-
erally considered to be unsound (Puri and Robinson,
2007). In fact, the increase in optimism in older age may
be a double edged sword since although the higher op-
timism allows the elderly to cope with increasing health
problems, it may also lead them to make poor financial
decisions (Chowdhury et al., 2013).
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4 The Neural Basis of the Opti-
mism Bias
If this bias is found in most healthy individuals and has
been evolutionarily selected for, then it is reasonable to
assume that there is a neurological network that un-
derpins it. (Sharot et al., 2007) published a pioneering
paper on the neural basis of the optimism bias. Using
functional MRI (fMRI), Sharot and colleagues demon-
strated that the rostral anterior cingulate (rACC) and
the amygdala showed enhanced activation when partici-
pants imagined positive future events. The authors sug-
gest that the amygdala could be involved in the men-
tal construction of future events that have a high emo-
tional valence. It was also suggested that the rACC
is involved in monitoring the subjective importance of
a future event and it may reflect the brain’s regulatory
mechanism to steer the individual to select an optimistic
outlook. The rACC was shown to be strongly function-
ally connected to the amygdala, suggesting an intercom-
municating neural network underlying the bias for posi-
tive predictions. The authors also pointed out that these
are the same regions abnormal in people who suffer from
a depressive illness. The pessimistic bias shown in de-
pressed patients may be due to a disruption of the above
neural network. Although researchers have investigated
functional brain networks there has been no research to
date on the structural networks that underlie the func-
tional networks. With the advent of advanced diffusion
MRI tractography techniques, there is an opportunity
for further research in understanding the brain network
that underlies the optimism bias.
In their 2011 study, Sharot and colleagues also pro-
vide data on the neural mechanisms involved in main-
taining optimism, in spite of evidence that one should
not be optimistic. The authors suggested that the right
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) may be involved in moni-
toring negative information. Interestingly the right IFG
of participants who scored low on trait optimism was
better at monitoring negative information than in those
participants who scored high on trait optimism. Con-
versely, the left IFG, the cerebellum, the left and right
medial frontal cortex (MFC) and superior frontal gyrus
(SFG) were involved in monitoring positive information.
These areas did not show any difference in participants
who scored high or low on trait optimism. The authors
were able to predict the amount that a person would
update his or her beliefs by looking at the reduction in
BOLD activity in the right IFG. It was suggested that
optimistic individuals have a reduced ability to neurally
code aversive information. The authors of the study
also suggest that the effect may be modulated by the
participant’s motivation to have the best future possi-
ble. The results were consistent with results in other
domains of neuroscience, where it was shown that these
areas are associated with behavioural and reality moni-
toring (Brunamonti et al., 2014; Sugimori et al., 2014).
The next important step was to identify whether any
of these regions are necessary for the optimism bias to
be present. While fMRI is a correlational method, Tran-
scranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) uses high field
magnetic pulses to directly interfere with the electri-
cal activity of a neural structure. If it can be shown
that a disruption in one anatomical structure results in
a change in the effect of the optimism bias, then there
will be a strong claim that the neural structure is neces-
sary in generating the neural process that produces the
behavioural effect known as the optimism bias. Using
TMS (Sharot et al., 2012) showed that a disruption of
the left IFG improved the participant’s ability to learn
from bad news. Participants who had TMS stimulation
on the left IFG updated their expectations even when
they received bad news. TMS to the right IFG did not
show this effect. It may seem contradictory that, while
the fMRI study suggested that the right IFG was in-
volved in monitoring negative information, it was TMS
to the left IFG that showed a change in behaviour. This
can be explained if the left IFG has an inhibitory role
(Anderson et al., 2004; Aron et al., 2004). If TMS in-
hibits the proper functioning of the left IFG it may cause
a disinhibition of the system, thus eliminating the bias.
This paper has shown a proof of principal that the opti-
mism bias can indeed be modulated by interfering with
the body’s hardware (or wetware).
Research has also shed light on the possible neuro-
transmitters that are involved in modulating the opti-
mism bias. (Sharot et al., 2009) showed that partic-
ipants who received L-DOPA expected more pleasure
out of future events than participants who have not re-
ceived the drug (Sharot et al., 2009). It was also shown
in a later experiment that an increase in dopamine in-
creases the optimism bias by impairing the participant’s
ability to learn from negative outcomes (Sharot et al.,
2012). In fact, the optimism bias increased as a function
of dopamine levels. This evidence is consistent with the
results of (Frank et al., 2004) who showed that parkinso-
nian patients that were off dopamine enhancing medica-
tion can learn better from negative outcomes, while pa-
tients on their medication do better learning from pos-
itive outcomes. These studies provide a possible mech-
anistic explanation behind dopaminergic antidepressant
drugs (Papakostas, 2006). In summary, the research of
recent years has shown that the optimism bias is asso-
ciated with frontal (IFG) and limbic (ACC and amyg-
dala) brain networks. It suggests that the left IFG is
important in the inhibition of updating expectations in
response to bad news. Finally it has been shown that
dopamine is an important modulatory neurotransmitter
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in the system and that the availability of dopamine in
the brain affects the extent of the optimism bias.
Although the scientific community has started to un-
derstand the brain basis of the optimism bias, further
questions remain unanswered. For example, is there a
particular sub region within the IFG that is more impor-
tant for this effect than other areas? The cytoarchitec-
ture of the IFG is not homogenous (it can be divided into
Brodmann areas 44, 45 and 47). Furthermore, language
research has shown a double dissociation within the left
IFG, with the anterior region being involved in seman-
tic processing while the posterior region is implicated
in phonological processing (Buckner et al., 1995; Fiez,
1997; Gough et al., 2005). Presumably, the anterior
and posterior aspects of the IFG are involved in differ-
ent structural and functional networks. It would be in-
teresting to see whether the optimism bias shows speci-
ficity to a particular location within the IFG. This line of
research could improve our structural understanding of
the networks involved in producing this bias. It will also
be interesting to see whether patients who have struc-
tural damage (secondary to stroke) to particular areas
show predictable deficits (or enhancements) in the opti-
mism bias. Do people who have acquired aphasia due to
a stroke in the left IFG show a reduced optimism bias?
This information would be invaluable to practicing clin-
icians involved in the rehabilitations of these patients.
5 Criticisms and Caveats
Although the optimism bias has been studied exten-
sively since the 1980s, there have been a few caveats
raised in the literature that cast doubt on some exper-
imental designs. (Harris and Hahn, 2011) argue that
three types of statistical artefacts may make them seem
to be unrealistically optimistic.
First, the authors show experiments that use discrete
attenuated scales rather than continuous scales that can
cause an appearance of optimism when there in fact is
none. This is because attenuated scales, for example a
scale from 1 to 5, does not allow for subtle differences to
be reported by the participant. Hence, even if partici-
pants are realistic in their true estimates, an attenuated
scale can make them appear unrealistically optimistic.
Second, due to minority undersampling, if an event is
rare enough, the likelihood of finding people who know
that they have a higher probability of experiencing that
event is rare, thus, since the minority is underrepre-
sented, our data will not show the true picture.
Finally, base rate regression is when people tend to
overestimate the risk that an event will occur to the
average person. Hence, an accurate prediction by the
participant of an event happening to them may be in-
terpreted as optimistic due to an overestimation of how
probable that event is for other people.
These limitations are mainly present in experiments
where groups of participants compare their risk to an-
other group of individuals. For example, when on aver-
age people think that they are better drivers than the
average driver. (Shepperd et al., 2013) argues that while
these statistical limitations look worrisome, they should
not cause undue concern. First, experiments using non
attenuated scale have still showed evidence, albeit less
dramatic, of the optimism bias. Second, minority un-
dersampling is only a problem when investigating rare
events and many experiments investigate relatively com-
mon events such as divorce, buying a nice house or get-
ting a good job (Weinstein, 1980). However, even for
these events, if many groups of people are examined,
for example in a meta-analysis, minority undersampling
disappears as a problem since the group will then be
large enough to adequately represent rare events. Fi-
nally, experiments still showed evidence of the optimism
bias when the base rate of an event was given, hence con-
trolling for base rate regression.
Rather than disproving the optimism bias theory, the
(Harris and Hahn, 2011) paper highlights potential pit-
falls that any experimenter should keep in mind prior to
designing their experiments.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, the optimism bias is a well-established
psychological phenomenon that, despite criticism, has
been replicated in many experiments. While it is gen-
erally an adaptive phenomenon, it can have disastrous
consequences (such as an economic collapse). Research
has moved away from a description of the phenomenon
onto trying to understand the underlying psychological
and neural mechanisms that underpin it. This has led
to investigation of ways of modulating this phenomenon.
The translational potential of this research has already
been recognised by some. Governments and institutions
are, in certain cases, modifying plans to accommodate
for it. For example, the budget for the 2012 London
Olympics was modified to accommodate the optimism
bias (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts,
2008, p. 8; Sharot, 2012). This research has the poten-
tial to be translated from bench to bedside. It is pro-
viding a psychological and neuroscientific grounding for
the treatment of depression. In a future where humans
have the ability to remove or enhance an optimistic bias
through pharmacological means or by TMS, the diffi-
culty may be in recognising when the optimism bias is
adaptive and when it is detrimental. Getting it wrong
may, in itself, have disastrous consequences.
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